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Recent Cases
REMEDIES FOR INTRUDING BRANCHES AND ROOTS -
STERLING v WYVEINSTEIN
When the free use of one s property is obstructed by intruding
trees which are owned by, and are on the land of, his neighbor, what
remedies are open to him? This question was presented m the recent
case of Sterling v Weinsteni decided by the District of Columbia
Municipal Court of Appeals. The parties were adjoining landowners
and the condition complained of was the protruding branches of a
tree from which leaves fell and clogged a gutter.2 Judgment of the
lower court for damages and abatement was reversed. Held: The
plaintiffs only remedy was self-help; viz., cutting to the boundary
regardless of whether the tree was a natural growth of the soil or was
artificially planted.
The remedy of self-help for intruding branches and roots has been
universally adopted as part of our common law 3 But is this the only
remedy? The Municipal Court of the District of Columbia, holding
that it was, quoted from a Massachusetts case4 which seems to be the
leading authority for that view-
"The common sense of the common law had recognized that it is
wiser to leave the individual to Drotect himself, if harm results to him
from the exercise of another s right to use his property in a reasonable
way, than to subject that other to the annoyance, and the public to
the burden, of actions at law, which would be likely to be innumer-
able and, in many instances, purely vexatious."5
The court's attention was called to RESTATENMENT OF TORTs which
175 A. 2d 144 (1950).
"The dangerous condition of another tree, which, because of sand having
been washed away around its roots, leaned towards the plaintiff's house, was not
considered in the majority opinion.
'Drummond v. Franck, 252 Ala. 474, 41 So. 2d 268 (1949); Grandona v.
Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, 11 Pac. 623 (1886); Jurgens v. Wiese, 151 Neb. 549, 38
N.W 2d 261 (1949); Murray v. Heabron, 74 N.E. 2d 648 (Ohio 1947); Cobb v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Vt. 342, 98 Adt. 758 (1916). See also Fick v.-Nilson,
220 P 2d 752 (Cal. 1950); Harndon v. Stultz, 124 Iowa 440, 100 N.W 329
(1904); Griefeld v. Gibraltar Fire & Manne Ins. Co., 199 Miss. 175, 24 So. 2d 356
(1946); Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296 (1884); Tanner v. Wallbrunn, 77
Mo. App. 262 k 1898); Wegener v. Sugarman, 104 N.J.L. 26, 138 At. 699 (1927);
Countryman v. Lighthill, 31 N.Y.S.C. Rep. (24 Hun.) 405 (1881); Mead v.
Vincent, 199 Okla. 508, 187 P 2d 994 (1947); Granberry v. Jones, 188 Tenn. 51,
216 S.W 2d 721 (1949); Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298 (1921).
'Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490 (1931).
Id. at --- 175 N.E. at 491.
'Section 839, 840.
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states the general rule that liability for conditions on one s land de-
pends upon whether the condition is artificial for which there is lia-
bility, or is a natural condition for which there is no liability A few
courts, following the RESTATEMENT, 7 have held trees to be conditions
on land to which this rule is applicable," i.e., holding trees of natural
growth to be natural conditions, and trees which have been planted to
be artificial conditions.9 The District of Columbia court expressly re-
pudiated this rule as applicable to trees for the logical reasons that,
(1) it is relatively impossible to prove whether a tree is a natural con-
dition of the land or whether it has been planted, (2) the difficulty in
establishing liability for planting an attractive tree and denying lia-
bility for letting an unattractive tree of natural growth remain un-
molested, and (3) the fact that a tree of natural growth might, m
part at least, be the result of human activity, such as cultivating,
fertilizing and trimmmg.10
The view of the dissenting judge, who agreed that self-help was
available, but maintained that it was not the only remedy, seems to
be the majority view in this country 1 In examining the other remedies
available, the writer will consider the right of the injured party to
receive compensatory damages, and the right to compel the owner of
the tree to remove it.
The right to receive compensatory damages seems to be the most
frequent remedy given by the courts although a few courts, as in the
principal case, refuse to allow such a recovery 12 The view that
damages should be allowed a plaintiff where he has suffered an injury
was formulated in Bucktngham v Elliott,i3 where the roots of mul-
berry trees had protruded into the plaintiff's land, damaging his well
and polluting the water. The court allowed recovery, drawing a dis-
Section 840, Illus. 4.
'Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296 (1884); Griefield v. Gibraltar Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 199 Miss. 175, 24 So. 2d 356 (1946).
'This section of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTs seems to be founded upon the
decision of Sparke v. Osborne, 7 C.L.R. 51 (1908), where it was said: "It is not
he who injures the neighbor, it is nature, and he is not responsible for nature s
doings."
"Another sound reason for cutting down on the rule of the RESTATEMENT IS
the urbanization of society which is discussed in PRossEi, TORTS 607.
2 C.J.S. 33.
Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232, 175 N.E. 490 (1931), appears to be
the leading case for the view that there can be no recovery. Here, even though
there appeared to be a sensible injury, the court said, "We see no distinction in
principle between damage done by shade, and damage caused bv overhanging
branches or invading roots. The principle involved is that an owner of land is at
liberty to use his land, and all of it, to grow trees. Their growth naturally and
reasonably will be accompamed by the extension of boughs and the penetration
of roots over and into the adjoining property of others."
" 62 Miss. 296 (1884).
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Unction between actions which were "groundless and vexatious" and
those where a "sensible injury" had occurred, and stated:
"It seems to be settled law that overhanging branches are
a nuisance, and it must follow that invading roots are. The person
intruded on by branches may cut them off; it must be true that one
may cut off invading roots; it must be true that he who is injured by
encroaching roots from his neighbors tree can recover damages
sustained from them. The right of action seems clear."'4
This court, recognizing the rule that overhanging branches constitute
a nuisance, thus giving rise to the remedy of self-help, pointed out
that before such a nuisance would give rise to an action for damages,
there must also be an injury over and above the mere intrusion and,
therefore, constituting a "sensible injury" Most of the cases in which
the sensible injury rule has been applied involved trees poisonous or
noxious in character; however, trees need not necessarily be of this
particular character in order to come within the rule.15
Once the plaintiff is allowed compensatory damages for such in-
vasions, it would seem to be logical to go one step further and allow-
him affirmative equitable relief by forcing the defendant to remove
the injurious tree. The fact that such trees constitute a continuing
trespass and give rise to many successive actions at lav is a sufficient
basis for equitable jurisdiction. Some courts of equity have ordered
abatement,", and a Vermont court enjoined the defendant from
planting trees which would cause serious injury to the plaintiff. 7
Before equity can give such relief, the circumstances of each case
must be considered m proportion to the extent of injury, the serious-
ness of it, the probability of greater damage, and the cost to the de-
fendant. As the Missouri Appellate Court said in Tanner v Wall-
brunn:1
"The extraordinary relief awarded in this case should not
be granted except where the right thereto is clear and the necessity
therefore imperative.
"Before this equity power can be successfully invoked
there should be a strong and mischievous case of pressing necessity[""
I1 d. at 301.
'Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 Atl. 883 (1911); Mead v. Vincent, 199
Okla. 508, 187 P 2d 994 (1947); Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac.
298 (1921); see also Countryman v. Lighthill, 31 N.Y.S.C. Rep. (24 Hun.) 405
(1881); Smith v. Hold, 174 Va. 213, 5 S.E. 2d 492 (1939) 2 C.T.S. 33.
"Fick v. Nilson, 220 P 2d 752 (Cal. 1950); Shevlin v. Johnston, 56 Cal.
App. 563, 205 Pac. 1087 (1922); Stevens v. Moon, 54 Cal. App. 737, 202 Pac.
961 (1921); Mead v. Vincent, 199 Okla. 508, 187 P 2d 994 (1947); Gostina v.
Rvland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 Pac. 298.
" Brock v. Conn. & P R. Co., 35 Vt. 0373 (Vt. Rep., Book 11, 133).
' 77 Mo. App. 262 (1898).
1" Id. at 265.
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The opinion m Sterling v XVeustem, allowing self-help as the only
remedy for intruding trees, is certainly contrary to the majority rule.
The reasonable solution to the problem is to make the remedy depend
upon the extent of injury If the action is "groundless and vexatious,"
not showing any real injury, the remedy of self-help would appear to
be sufficient. When the injury is increased so as to be classified as a
"sensible injury" one should have an action at law for the actual
damages caused. If, however, the injury is serious and threatens to
involve many successive law suits for the continuing trespass, or
threatens to become serious, one should have, besides an action at law
for the actual damages sustained, an action in equity to enjoin planting
or force removal.
ROBERT C. MOFFIT
THE QUESTIONABLE USE OF RES GESTAE -
DAWS v COMMONWEALTH
One of the most controversial subjects in the field of evidence is
res gestae. This legal concept was introduced into the law to admit
statements surrounding the commission of an act so that the nature of
the act could be clearly understood. If the words surrounding an act
are not admitted, the act alone may be incomplete and ambiguous.
The Kentucky court has applied the term res gestae to at least five
distinct rules of evidence: verbal act, spontaneous exclamation, circum-
stantial evidence, mental and physical condition, and admissions of an
agent.' Since it has been extended to include more than one rule of
evidence, the courts and lawyers have tended to intermingle some of
the elements of these well defined principles and created a great deal
of confusion as to the exact grounds upon which certain utterances
are admitted or excluded.
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which means "things done."' In its
use in the law it has been defined as "Matter incidental to the main
fact and explanatory of it, including acts and words which are so
closely connected therewith as to constitute a part of the transaction,
and without a knowledge of which the rmain fact might not be prop-
'Mann v. Cavanaugh, 110 Ky. 776, 62 S.W 854 (1901) (verbal act);
Norton s Adm r v. Winstead, 218 Ky. 488, 291 S.W 723 (1927) (spontaneous
exclamation); Stems Coal Co. v. Evans Adm r, 88 Ky. L. Rep. 755, 111 S.W 808
(1908) (circumstantial evidence); Lousville & N. R. Co. v. Owens, 164 Ky. 557,
175 S.W 1089 (1915) (mental and physical condition); see Niles v. Steiden
Stores, Inc., 801 Ky. 80, 190 S.W 2d 876 (1945) (admissions of an agent).
'WEBSTER s NEw INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY, UNABP IED (2d ed. 1944).
